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We construct a general Bayesian framework that can be used to organize beliefs and to update
them when new information becomes available. The framework includes classical, quantum, and
other alternative models of Bayesian reasoning that may arise in future physical theories. It is
only based on the rule of conditional probabilities and the requirement that the agent’s beliefs
are consistent across time. From these requirements, we show that ideal experiments within every
Bayesian theory must satisfy the exclusivity principle, which is a key to explain quantum correlations.
As a consequence, the limits to the strength of correlations set by the exclusivity principle can be
interpreted as the ultimate limits set by Bayesian consistency. It is an open question whether
Bayesian reasoning alone is sufficient to recover all of quantum theory.
Introduction.—Quantum theory portrays a world
where the outcomes of individual measurements cannot
be predicted with certainty. And yet, the quantum pre-
dictions are strikingly accurate and successfully explain
an astonishingly broad range of phenomena. The rea-
sons for this broad applicability still remain controver-
sial. Does the quantum framework capture a bundle of
primitive facts about the world? Or it is just a general-
purpose tool for guessing the outcomes of experiments?
Albeit with a variety of nuances, different interpre-
tations of quantum theory tend to favor either one or
the other view. For example, Everett’s interpretation [1]
holds that the quantum framework refers to a multitude
of universes. On the other hand, Bohr’s interpretation
[2] holds that the quantum framework concerns what ex-
perimenters can say about nature rather than nature in
itself. In a similar way, QBism [3] views the quantum
framework as a set of rules that constrain how agents
make bets about the outcomes of their experiments.
Different positions about the interpretation are re-
flected into different attitudes towards the counterintu-
itive correlations arising in quantum theory. Since Bell
[4], we have known that quantum correlations are incom-
patible with the intuitive worldview known as local re-
alism. But intriguingly, the quantum violations of Bell’s
inequalities are not maximal: more general theories com-
patible with relativistic causality could in principle lead
to larger violations [5–7]. Following up on this observa-
tion, various physical principles have been proposed to
explain the quantum bounds on correlations [8–12]. Be-
∗ giulio@cs.hku.hk
† adan@us.es
‡ matthias.kleinmann@uni-siegen.de
§ markusm23@univie.ac.at
hind this approach lies the idea that the quantum bounds
are a fact of the world, and, as such, they should be ex-
plained in terms of laws the world is subjected to.
However, this is not the only option. Instead of search-
ing for principles constraining how nature behaves, one
could search for consistency conditions that an agent
should satisfy when assigning probabilities to the out-
comes of experiments.
In this paper we examine the consequences of adopt-
ing a Bayesian point of view [3], referring to an agent
who holds prior beliefs about the object of its bets, and
who updates those beliefs when a new piece of informa-
tion becomes available. The beliefs held by the agent are
used to make predictions about the outcomes of future
experiments. The key assumptions in this framework are
that beliefs undergo updates according to the rule of con-
ditional probabilities, and that beliefs at different times
are consistent with each other.
Strikingly, we find that such minimalistic assumptions
guarantee the existence of a class of ideal experiments
that obey the exclusivity principle [13–17], which is a
key to unlock many of the puzzling bounds on quan-
tum correlations. Under mild assumptions, the exclusiv-
ity principle implies the Tsirelson bound [18] and, more
generally, the quantum bounds for any Bell or Kochen-
Specker scenario [19]. Therefore, our result suggests that
all such bounds could be explained as a consequence of
basic Bayesian reasoning. Whether or not all of quantum
theory can be derived from Bayesian consistency condi-
tions remains an open problem, but our result provides
evidence that an important part of quantum theory can
be reconstructed from elementary rules on how Bayesian
agents should place their bets.
Beliefs and probabilities.— Consider the situation of
an agent who makes bets about a given physical system.
The content of the bets is specified by a sample space X,
2equipped with a σ-algebra of events Σ, namely a collec-
tion of subsets of X satisfying the properties (i) X ∈ Σ,
(ii) E ∈ Σ implies (X \ E) ∈ Σ, and (iii) (Ei)i ⊂ Σ im-
plies
⋃
iEi ∈ Σ. In typical cases, X is a finite set and Σ
is the power set of X. The simplest bet is to bet on an
event E. Operationally, this means that there exists an
experiment with two outcomes, corresponding to E and
its complement E = X \E, and that the agent bets that
the experiment will return the outcome E.
More generally, a bet can involve an experiment with
multiple outcomes, corresponding to a partition E =
(Ei)i of the sample space X into disjoint events. For
brevity, we will identify the experiment and the cor-
responding partition. These basic experiments will be
called principal experiments, in order to distinguish them
from more elaborate experiments where the agent per-
forms sequences of operations.
In making a bet, the agent will rely on its beliefs, in-
cluding beliefs on the laws of physics, or beliefs on the
prior history of the physical system involved in the bet.
We denote by B the set of all possible beliefs. For a
given belief β and for a given experiment E = (Ei)i,
the agent assigns a probability distribution reflecting its
expectation that the event Ei will occur in the experi-
ment E. In the following, we will make the standard as-
sumption that the probability assignment depends only
on the event Ei, and not on the specific experiment E. In
other words, we will assume that every belief β induces a
probability distribution p : E 7→ p(E|β) satisfying the
usual conditions (i) p(E|β) ≥ 0 for all events E, (ii)
p(
⋃
i Ei|β) =
∑
i p(Ei|β) whenever all Ei are mutually
disjoint, and (iii) p(X|β) = 1. These conditions are the
standard Kolmogorov axioms of probability and are com-
mon to most Bayesian approaches to probability [20, 21].
In a Dutch book approach, they amount to the idea that
a bookmaker assigns odds to individual events.
It is important to stress that the belief β determines
the probability assignment p(E|β), but not vice versa: in
general, a belief contains much more than just the out-
come probabilities of principal experiments. For exam-
ple, in quantum theory a belief is described by a density
matrix, while a principal experiment corresponds to a
projective measurement, with the projectors associated
to a given basis. The probability assignment depends
only on the diagonal entries of the density matrix in the
given basis, and therefore it is not sufficient to identify
the density matrix.
Bayesian updates.—The central question in the
Bayesian approach is how the agent should update its
belief when new information becomes available. Suppose
that the agent receives a guarantee that E is the case.
The question is how the agent should update its beliefs
in order to incorporate this new piece of information. In-
tuitively, the new belief β′ should be the old belief β, ad-
justed to take into account that E is the case. This yields
an update map, which we assume to depend only on the
event E and on the initial belief β. We will denote the
new belief as β′ = Eβ, indicating that the information
about the occurrence of E has been incorporated into β.
In the following, whenever the notation Eβ is used it is
assumed that p(E|β) is non-zero. Otherwise, the belief β
would be incompatible with event E, meaning that the
agent would have no way to combine the prior belief β
with the occurrence of E.
The point of updating a belief is to compute condi-
tional probability distributions. We demand that the
probability assignment for the updated belief Eβ is given
by the rule of conditional probabilities:
Axiom 1 (Rule of conditional probabilities). If
p(E|β) 6= 0, then the updated belief Eβ satisfies the rule
of conditional probabilities
p(F |Eβ) = p(E ∩ F |β)
p(E|β) . (1)
The rule of conditional probabilities implies many
properties of the update map β 7→ Eβ. For example,
it implies that, once the agent updates its belief based
on the event E, the agent becomes certain of the event
E. Indeed, one has p(E|Eβ) = 1, which follows from
letting E = F in Eq. (1).
We stress that the update map does not represent a
physical process on the observed system, but rather an
operation internal to the agent. In the following, we for-
mulate two conditions that the update should satisfy in
order for the agent to be consistent with its beliefs at all
moments of time.
Forward consistency.—Suppose that the agent believes
that the occurrence of the event E is certain, p(E|β) = 1.
In this case, the occurrence of E does not add any new
information. As a consequence, the update should be
trivial, namely Eβ = β.
Axiom 2 (Forward consistency). If the agent is certain
that the event E will occur, then the occurrence of E does
not change the agents’s belief. Mathematically: for every
β ∈ B and every E ∈ Σ, p(E|β) = 1 implies Eβ = β.
Since forward consistency is an axiom about the belief
of the agent, it is not a law of physics, but just a con-
sistency requirement. It constrains the agent in how it
updates the belief forward in time, coherently with the
belief held at the present moment. A simple consequence
of forward consistency is that the total event E = X does
not lead to any update, namely Xβ = β, ∀β ∈ B.
Actions.—So far, we considered the situation where an
agent bets directly on the occurrence of a certain event.
More generally, the conditions under which a bet is made
can be altered by some action before an experiment is
performed. We use the notion “action” broadly, including
situations in which the system evolves under its natural
dynamics. In this sense, actions need not be intentional:
what matters is only that the agent associates a change of
its belief to what occurred to the physical system under
consideration.
We denote the set of all actions as Act. It is natural
to assume that actions can be arbitrarily composed one
3after the other, namely that there is an action AB, corre-
sponding to the execution of action A right after action
B. The composition is associative, meaning that only
the temporal sequence of actions matters, and not how
the actions are grouped together. Among the possible
actions, we include the trivial action I, which preserves
the current state of affairs. Mathematically, this makes
Act a monoid [22] (see also [23, 24]).
When an action A is performed, the agent will gen-
erally change its belief. We will denote the new be-
lief as β′ = Aβ, meaning that the initial state of af-
fairs described by β has undergone the change induced
by the action A. An action A is reversible if there ex-
ists another action A′ that acts as its inverse, namely
A′Aβ = AA′β = β, ∀β ∈ B.
Backward consistency.—When actions are included in
the picture, additional consistency conditions arise. Sup-
pose that the agent holds the belief β and suppose that,
in the context of that belief, the proposition “event F is
the case after action A” implies the proposition “event E
is the case before action A”.
Now, consider the following scenarios: Scenario (1)
The agent is promised that F will be the case, should
the action A be performed. Scenario (2) The agent per-
forms the action A and, only afterwards, it is promised
that F is the case. In Scenario (1), if the agent decides to
perform the action A, its belief can already be updated
to Eβ, even before the action A is performed. After the
action A, the belief will be updated to AEβ, and finally
to FAEβ, taking into account that F is promised to be
the case. In Scenario (2), the agent will update its be-
lief to Aβ, after performing the action A, and then to
FAβ, upon receiving the guarantee that F is the case.
Consistency between the two scenarios requires that the
final belief of the agent should be the same, namely,
FAEβ = FAβ.
It remains to specify what it means for proposition
“F is the case after A” to imply proposition “E is the
case before A” in the context of the belief β. To state a
relation between these two proposition, the agent can as-
sign a joint probability distribution to the events (E,F ),
(E,F ), (E,F ), and (E,F ). Let us denote the joint prob-
ability distribution by jβ,A(Y, Z), with Y ∈ {E,E} and
Z ∈ {F, F}. Consistency with the agent’s beliefs re-
quires jβ,A(Y, Z) = p(Z|AY β)p(Y |β) when p(Y |β) 6= 0,
and jβ,A(Y, Z) = 0 otherwise. Inferences from the event
Z to the event Y can be made in terms of the conditional
probability distribution
jβ,A(Y |Z) = jβ,A(Y, Z)∑
Y ′∈{E,E} jβ,A(Y
′, Z)
. (2)
In particular, we say that the proposition “F is the case
after A” implies the proposition “E is the case before A”
in the context of the belief β if jβ,A(E|F ) = 1.
Axiom 3 (Backward consistency). If the proposition
“event F is the case after action A” implies the propo-
sition “event E is the case before action A” in the con-
text of belief β, then the occurrence of F after A leads
to the same updated belief as the occurrence of F after
A and after the occurrence of E. Mathematically: If
jβ,A(E|F ) = 1, then FAEβ = FAβ.
In Appendix A we show that quantum theory satisfies
forward and backward consistency if the events are rep-
resented by orthogonal projectors and the updates follow
Lüders’ rule.
General Bayesian theories.—A general Bayesian the-
ory is a tuple (B,Act,Σ,U , p), consisting of a set of be-
liefs B, a monoid of actions Act, acting on the beliefs,
a σ-algebra of events Σ, acting on the beliefs through
an update map U : (E, β) 7→ Eβ, and a probability as-
signment p(E|β). The update map is required to satisfy
Bayes’ rule and the properties of forward and backward
consistency.
Sequential experiments and ideal experiments.—A se-
quential experiment consists of a sequence of actions
interspersed by principal experiments. For example,
(A,E,B,F) represents a sequence consisting of an ac-
tion A, followed by a principal experiment E, followed by
another action B, and by another principal experiment
F. The joint probability distribution of the outcomes
are computed via the rule of conditional probabilities.
For example, the probability distribution of the sequen-
tial experiment (A,E,B,F) is p(F |BEAβ) p(E|Aβ), with
E ∈ E and F ∈ F.
We now focus our attention on a special class of exper-
iments that leave the agent with the option of gathering
more refined pieces of information in the future. We say
that an experiment (B,F) with partition F = (Fi,l)i,l is
a refinement of another experiment (A,E) with partition
E = (Ei)i if
∑
l
p(Fi,l|Bβ) = p(Ei|Aβ) ∀i , ∀β ∈ B . (3)
Intuitively, if an experiment does not disturb any of its
refinements then this experiment is disturbing the belief
as little as possible and hence captures a central property
of sharp measurements in quantum theory [25–27]. Here
we say that the experiment (A,E) is sequentially refinable
if there exists an actionA′ such that, for every refinement
(B,F) and for every initial belief β, the probability of
the event Fi,l in the experiment (B,F) is equal to the
joint probability of the events (Ei, Fi,l) in the sequential
experiment (A,E,A′,B,F). In formula,
p(Fi,l|Bβ) = p(Fi,l|BA′EiAβ) p(Ei|Aβ) (4)
for every refinement (B,F), for every event Fi,l ∈ F, and
for every belief β ∈ B with p(Ei|Aβ) 6= 0. This means
that the coarse-grained experiment (A,E) does not al-
ter the probability assignment for the fine-grained ex-
periment (B,F), provided that the agent performs the
reversing action A′ between them.
So far we considered individual experiments. Let us
consider now the whole family of experiments of the form
(A,E) where the action A is fixed and the partition E is
4variable. If there exists a common reversing action A′
such that condition (4) holds for all partitions E, then
we call the action A ideal. In Appendix B we prove the
following
Theorem 1. In any general Bayesian theory, every re-
versible action A is ideal.
If A is an ideal action and E is a partition, we say that
(A,E) is an ideal experiment. For every event E ∈ E, we
call the pair (A, E) is an ideal result.
Recovering the exclusivity principle.—We now show
that such ideal results satisfy the exclusivity principle
[13–19, 25, 28], also named global exclusivity [14] or con-
sistent exclusivity [16, 17, 25]. In the language of gen-
eral Bayesian theories, the exclusivity principle refers to
any set of ideal results { (An, En) }n, which are pairwise
mutually exclusive. Two results (Ai, Ei) and (Aj , Ej)
are mutually exclusive, if there exists an ideal action
B and a partition F with events F, F ′ ∈ F, such that
p(Ei|Aiβ) = p(F |Bβ) and p(Ej |Ajβ) = p(F ′|Bβ) for all
β ∈ B. The exclusivity principle states that, if every pair
in a set of ideal results is mutually exclusive, then the
corresponding probabilities satisfy the bound
∑
n
p(En|Anβ) ≤ 1 (5)
for every belief β ∈ B. Crucially, the above bound holds
in every general Bayesian theory:
Theorem 2. The ideal results in every general Bayesian
theory satisfy the exclusivity principle.
The proof is provided in Appendix C.
The exclusivity principle is known to characterize the
exact quantum bounds on the set of correlations in a
variety of scenarios [13–19, 28], under mild additional
assumptions. Combined with this fact, our result sug-
gests that the bounds on quantum correlations can be
interpreted as the ultimate limit posed by Bayesian con-
sistency.
Conclusions.—We have built a framework for general
Bayesian theories, which can be applied to the classical
and quantum domain, or to more general alternatives. In
this framework, the agent holds a belief in order to place
bets about the outcomes of experiments. The belief is
updated when an action is performed and when a new
piece of information becomes available. The constraints
that the update has to satisfy are the rule of conditional
probabilities and the conditions of forward consistency
and backward consistency, which express the consistency
of beliefs at different moments of time. These three re-
quirements allow us to define a privileged class of ideal
experiments. We showed that the results of the class of
ideal experiments satisfy the exclusivity principle which,
under mild assumptions, implies tight bounds on the set
of quantum correlations for any Bell or Kochen-Specker
scenario [19]. Therefore, our result shows that an impor-
tant part of quantum theory can be reconstructed from
elementary rules on how a Bayesian agent should bet
about the outcomes of future experiments.
Whether or not all of quantum theory can be derived
from Bayesian consistency conditions remains an open
problem. If such a derivation turns out to be possible,
it would support the view that quantum theory is a con-
sequence of how agents subjectively organize perceptions
[29]. If such a derivation is not possible, the attempt
to find it might point out to the crucial physical ingre-
dient that identifies quantum theory among other phys-
ical theories [30]. In contrast to earlier reconstructions
of quantum theory [31–37] that have been mostly non-
committal about interpretations, such a derivation, even
if only partially successful, would have the potential to
shed new light on the interpretations of quantum theory.
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Appendix A: Forward and backward consistency in
quantum theory
Here we show that forward and backward consistency
hold for projective measurements in quantum theory.
We start with forward consistency. Let ρ be a density
matrix, E be a projector, and E = I − E be its or-
thogonal complement, I being the identity matrix. The
condition that the event described by E happens with
certainty on ρ is tr(Eρ) = 1. Forward consistency is
the statement that, under this condition, the updated
state EρE/ tr(Eρ) is equal to the original state ρ. The
proof is simple. The certainty condition tr(Eρ) = 1 is
equivalent to tr(EρE) = 0, which in turn is equivalent
to EρE = 0. Since this equation is of the form AA† = 0
with A = E
√
ρ, we have A = 0 and thus E
√
ρ = 0 and√
ρE = 0. This leads to
ρ = (E + E)ρ(E + E) = EρE, (A1)
5proving that quantum theory satisfies forward consis-
tency.
We now show that quantum theory satisfies back-
ward consistency, too. Let A be a completely posi-
tive and trace preserving map with Kraus representation
A : ρ 7→∑iAiρA†i , ρ be a density matrix, (Ei)i and F be
projectors with
∑
iEi = I. Clearly, the condition that
the occurrence of F implies the occurrence of an event
Ek is equivalent to the condition that the occurrence of F
excludes the occurrence of every event Ei 6= Ek. Hence,
we have
∑
i6=k
tr[FA(EiρEi)] = 0. (A2)
In turn, this implies FAj(EiρEi)A
†
jF = 0 for all j and all
i 6= k and by the same argument as above, FAjEi√ρ =
0 =
√
ρEiA
†
jF . This way we obtain
FA(ρ)F =
∑
j,i,i′
FAjEiρEi′A
†
jF
=
∑
j
FAjEkρEkA
†
jF
= FA(EkρEk)F,
(A3)
proving that quantum theory satisfies backward consis-
tency.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof uses three lemmas, provided in the following:
Lemma 3. Let (C,F) be a refinement of (I,E), with F =
(Fi,l)i,l and E = (Ei)i, and let Fi be the event defined by
Fi :=
⋃
l Fi,l. Then,
p(Fi|Cβ) = p(Ei|β) ∀i , ∀β ∈ B (B1)
and the equality
FiCβ = CEiβ (B2)
holds for every outcome i and for every β ∈ B such that
p(Ei|β) 6= 0.
Proof. Since (C,F) is a refinement of (I,E), Eq. (B1)
is due to
p(Fi|Cβ) =
∑
l
p(Fi,l|Cβ) = p(Ei|β) . (B3)
The first equality follows from the additivity of the prob-
abilities of disjoint events.
Applying Eq. (B1) to the initial belief Eiβ, we obtain
the condition
p(Fi|CEiβ) = p(Ei|Eiβ) = p(Ei ∩ Ei|β)
p(Ei|β) = 1, (B4)
the second equality following from Eq. (1) in the main
text. Since the agent is sure that the event Fi will occur,
forward consistency implies that no update should take
place on the belief CEiβ. Hence, we obtain the relation
FiCEiβ = CEiβ . (B5)
Now, consider the joint probability distribution
p(Fj |CEiβ) p(Ei|β). Using Eq. (B4), we obtain
jβ,E,C(Ei|Fi) = 1. Then, backward consistency implies
FiCEiβ = FiCβ . (B6)
Combining Eqs. (B5) and (B6), we obtain Eq. (B2).
Lemma 4. The trivial action I is ideal.
Proof. For an arbitrary partition E = (Ei)i we
consider an arbitrary refinement (C,F) of (I,E) with
F = (Fi,l)i,l. Let Fi be the event defined by Fi :=
⋃
l Fi,l.
Using the rule of conditional probabilities, we obtain for
p(Fi|Cβ) 6= 0,
p(Fi,l|Cβ) = p(Fi,l ∩ Fi|Cβ)
= p(Fi,l|FiCβ) p(Fi|Cβ)
= p(Fi,l|CEiβ) p(Ei|β) ,
(B7)
the last equality following from Eqs. (B2) and (B1).
If p(Fi|Cβ) = 0, then Eq. (B1) implies p(Ei|β) = 0.
Eq. (B7) is exactly the condition for sequential refinabil-
ity, Eq. (4) from the main text with A = A′ = I. Since
these considerations hold for any partition E and any
refinement of (I,E), the action I is ideal.
We now prove the following reformulation of Theo-
rem 1 in the main text:
Lemma 5. If the action A is reversible, then A is ideal.
Proof. We need to show that for every partition E =
(Ei)i, for every refinement (B,F) of (A,E), and for every
belief β, the condition of sequential refinability, Eq. (4)
from the main text, is satisfied.
Since A is reversible, all elements of B can be obtained
as Aβ. Setting β′ := Aβ and C := BA′, Eq. (4) from the
main text becomes
p(Fi,l|Cβ′) = p(Fi,l|CEiβ′) p(Ei|β′) (B8)
for all β′ ∈ B with p(Ei|β′) 6= 0. This is exactly the
condition of sequential refinability for the trivial action I
(with reversing action I ′ = I) applied to the experiment
(C,F). Our goal is to show that this condition holds.
With our definitions, the condition that (B,F) is a re-
finement of (A,E) reads
∑
l
p(Fi,l|Cβ′) = p(Ei|β′) ∀β′ ∈ B , (B9)
which in turn is equivalent to the fact that (C,F) is a re-
finement of (I,E). Due to Lemma 4, this implies that for
6(I,E), the condition of sequential refinability is satisfied
for (C,F), that is, Eq. (B8) holds. Hence the condition
for sequential refinability is satisfied for (A,E) applied to
the experiment (B,F). Since the above argument holds
for every partition E and the reversing action is always
A′, the action A is ideal.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 follows the line of argument
in Ref. [25].
Lemma 6. Let (A1, E1) and (A2, E2) be two mutually
exclusive ideal outcomes and let A′1 be the reversing ac-
tion in condition (4) of the main text. Then the equality
p(E2|A2A′1E1A1β) p(E1|A1β) = p(E2|A2β) (C1)
holds for all beliefs β with p(E1|A1β) 6= 0, while other-
wise p(E2|A2β) = 0.
Proof. Since (A1, E1) and (A2, E2) are mutually ex-
clusive, there exists an experiment (B,F), with parti-
tion F = (Fi)i satisfying p(F1|Bβ) = p(E1|A1β) and
p(F2|Bβ) = p(E2|A2β) for all beliefs β. The experiment
(B,F) is a refinement of the experiment (A1,E1) with
E1 = (E1, E1). This holds since for any belief β we have
p(F1|Bβ) = p(E1|A1β) (C2)
and
∑
i6=1
p(Fi|Bβ) = 1− p(F1|Bβ)
= 1− p(E1|A1β) = p(E1|A1β) .
(C3)
Now, the sequential refinability of the experiment
(A1,E1) implies for every belief β with p(E1|A1β) 6= 0
the equality
p(F2|Bβ) = p(F2|BA′1E1A1β) p(E1|A1β)
= p(E2|A2A′1E1A1β) p(E1|A1β) .
(C4)
Since p(F2|Bβ) = p(E2|A2β) this yields Eq. (C1). Fi-
nally, if p(E1|A1β) = 0, then Eq. (C3) yields immedi-
ately p(E2|A2β) = p(F2|Bβ) = 0.
We are now ready to prove the following formulation
of Theorem 2:
Lemma 7. Let { (An, En) | n = 1, . . . , k } be a set of
ideal results which are pairwise mutually exclusive. Then
the condition
k∑
n=1
p(En|Anβ) ≤ 1 (C5)
is satisfied for every belief β.
Proof. We define Ei = (Ei, Ei), let A′i denote the
ideal reverse of Ai. Consider the sequential experiment
defined by the following procedure:
(I) Move to step (R1).
(Ri) Perform the action (Ai,Ei,A′i). If the outcome was
Ei, then move to step (Ti). If the outcome was Ei
and i + 1 = k, then move to step (Tk+1). In all
other cases move to step (Ri+1).
(Ts) Report outcome s and terminate.
The above procedure defines a sequential experiment
with outcomes s = 1, 2, . . . k+1. For s ≤ k, the outcome
s is the outcome corresponding to the event Es. We de-
note by qβ(s) the probability assigned to the outcome s
when the initial belief is β.
We now show that qβ(s) = p(Es|Asβ) for every s ≤ k.
We start by defining the sequence of beliefs β0, β1, . . . , βk
via β0 := β and
βj := A′j Ej Ajβj−1 . (C6)
Then, the belief βi−1 is the belief of the agent at the
beginning of step (Ri). We first treat the case s = 1 and
obtain
qβ(1) = p(E1|A1β0) = p(E1|A1β) . (C7)
For the case s ≥ 2, we use (s − 1) times Lemma 6,
namely for the two mutually exclusive ideal results
(As, Es) and (Aj , Ej) for j = s− 1, s− 2, . . . , 1. We first
put aside the cases where p(Ej |Ajβj−1) = 0 for some
j < s. Then we obtain
qβ(s) = p(Es|Asβs−1)
s−1∏
j=1
(1− qβ(j))
= p(Es|AsA′s−1Es−1As−1βs−2)
× p(Es−1|As−1βs−2)
s−2∏
j=1
(1− qβ(j))
= p(Es|Asβs−2)
s−2∏
j=1
(1− qβ(j))
...
= p(Es|Asβ0) = p(Es|Asβ) .
(C8)
Since the sum of the probabilities to obtain one of the
outcomes s = 1, . . . , k + 1 must be one, we obtain
k∑
s=1
p(Es|Asβ) =
k∑
s=1
qβ(s) ≤ 1 . (C9)
For the corner cases, let t be the smallest index such
that p(Et|Atβt−1) = 0 holds. According to Lemma 6
7this implies p(Es|Asβt−1) = 0 for all s > t. We obtain
for s > t,
0 = p(Es|Asβt−1)
t−1∏
j=1
(1− qβ(j))
...
= p(Es|Asβ0) = p(Es|Asβ) .
(C10)
Therefore we have
k∑
s
p(Es|Asβ) =
t∑
s
p(Es|Asβ) =
t∑
s
qβ(s) ≤ 1 .
(C11)
Where, in fact, equality holds, since qβ(s) = 0 for all
s > t.
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